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TALL STEPS, SLIPPERY SLOPES & LEARNING CURVES IN THE 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper offers a perspective from psychology on Donald Langevoort's paper, 
The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions.3  After briefly introducing my field, I will 
address two themes, "tall steps" and "slippery slopes," then discuss avenues to explore for 
the future, which I call learning curves, and offer a few conclusions.  I leave the legal 
implications of mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") to the other discussant, Joan Heminway.4  
Much of my research in organizational psychology has focused on work groups 
and their effectiveness.  That research led me to the related field of organizational behavior 
and, more recently, to behavioral economics.  I have worked as a consultant to five CEOs 
involved in decisions on mergers and/or acquisitions. 
II. KEY THEMES: TALL STEPS & SLIPPERY SLOPES 
Langevoort's first major theme, "tall steps,"5 concerns the arguments to overcome 
in making a convincing case for cognitive bias and psychological processes that undermine 
rationality in decisions about M&A.  The height of the steps reflects the difficulty of arguing 
successfully against the "rational actor model"6 that dominates today's thinking in corporate 
and securities law in favor of the "bounded rationality"7 described in psychology and related 
fields.  
A second theme, "slippery slopes," refers to the path that leads from psychological 
processes that undermine rationality, such as overconfidence and hubris,8 to undesirable 
outcomes for firms involved in M&A, including "excessive risk-taking and concealment of 
those risks from investors."9  
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the Conference on Behavior and Business Law at the University of Tennessee College of 
Law, October 2, 2010, in Knoxville, Tennessee. 
2 Professor, Department of Psychology, Austin Peay Building #303, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 37916.  
E-mail: esundstr@utk.edu.  
3 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. 
BUS. L. 65 (2011) (exploring the relationship between psychology and corporate and securities law). 
4 Joan MacLeod Heminway, A More Critical Use of Fairness Opinions as a Practical Approach to the Behavioral Economics 
of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 81 (2011). 
5 Langevoort, supra note 3, at 66.  
6 Id. at 65.  
7 See generally D. Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697 
(2003) (discussing decision-making processes).  See also D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1984).   
8 Langevoort, supra note 3, at 70-71. 
9 Id. at 78.  
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Understanding the elusive connections – specifically when and how psychological 
processes create slippery slopes to adverse outcomes in M&A – could represent a third 
theme, aptly summed up in a phrase from the title of one of Langevoort's recent papers: 
"…chasing the greased pig."10  
Recent findings from psychology and related fields suggest ways in which the 
slopes can become slippery and ways to make the steps less tall.  I will identify extensions 
and questions for each of the four steps in turn.  Briefly, the steps refer to: 1) situational 
factors in biased, individual decision-making; 2) personality factors in irrational decisions; 3) 
institutional features of organizations, including "de-biasing" influences; and 4) the 
normative question – "so what?" – which may point toward interventions. 
A. Situational Factors in Biased, Individual Decision-Making 
Recent research from behavioral economics may offer help with the first step by 
identifying situational factors consistently related to sources of cognitive bias and enabling 
more robust behavioral predictions than in the past.  Dan Ariely's book Predictably Irrational11 
reports several studies that found situational variables associated with sources of cognitive 
errors, involving both distorted perceptions and biased decisions.  For example, in the 
"decoy effect," a form of perceptual anchoring, the presence of a higher-priced third option 
made a medium-priced option more attractive than when it represented one of only two 
options.  Another experiment demonstrated an expectation effect, familiar in the psychology 
of perception, in which individuals misperceived ambiguous events consistent with what 
they expected.  These and other studies summarized in Predictably Irrational point to 
identifiable circumstances under which cognitive biases become relatively likely. 
Evidence linking irrational decisions in organizations to situational factors comes 
from a new study of corporate illegality published this year in ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT 
JOURNAL, one of the top journals of management.12  Researchers predicted the greatest 
illegality under conditions of high external expectations based on above-average stock 
performance, and high "social aspirations" based on peer firms' financial performance.  They 
obtained reports of 469 incidents of corporate fraud, environmental violations, false claims, 
and anti-competitive violations from 1990 through 1999.  They also obtained records of 
stock prices and returns on investments for the 194 S&P 500 firms involved.  After 
accounting for control variables based on firms' characteristics, results supported the 
hypothesis linking corporate illegality with high social aspirations.  The study also found, 
only for prominent firms, the predicted correlation of corporate illegality with high 
expectations based on abnormally high performance. 
Recent work expands the list of sources of irrational decisions in organizations to 
include what could be called "inferential bias."  For example, a 2007 book by Phil 
Rosenzweig13 describes eight "delusions that deceive managers," including the "halo effect," 
a familiar tendency to over-generalize evaluations to include attributes beyond those directly 
                                                 
10 Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and 
Ethics of Financial Risk-taking, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
11 DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008). 
12 Yuri Mishina et al., Why "Good" Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations, and 
Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality, 53 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 701 (2010).  
13 PHIL ROSENZWEIG, THE HALO EFFECT … AND THE EIGHT OTHER BUSINESS DELUSIONS THAT DECEIVE 
MANAGERS (2007). 
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observed. Another inferential bias involves "the delusion of single explanations," or 
attributing company performance to one factor instead of the multitude of factors likely 
involved.  Such faulty analysis of information about businesses, along with over-
interpretation of media stories, could help lead to misperceptions of company value, 
performance, future potential market share, and other key elements in M&A.  Potential 
sources of bias in individual decisions also include interpersonal influences, for instance in 
relationships with co-workers, competitors, and customers.  A review of research on 
strategic decision-making in organizations identifies coalitions as a key source of influence.14 
In sum, recent research from psychology reinforces the sources of cognitive bias 
that Langevoort cited, and suggests others, including expectation effects, inferential bias, and 
coalitions.  However, this does little to change the bottom line for the first tall step.  
Available evidence continues to point to predictable, situational influences that can increase 
the likelihood of irrational individual decisions.  When executives participating in decisions 
about M&A find themselves in certain circumstances, the evidence suggests that they may 
become more likely to make decisions with predictable irrationality.   
B. Personality Factors in Irrational Decisions 
As for the second tall step, concerning the role of personality in irrational 
decisions, Langevoort cites substantial evidence for two traits of executives related to 
cognitive bias.  The first, hubris, refers to a "winner's curse that arises out of any auction-like 
setting because the winner will, by definition, have the most optimistic valuation of the asset 
in question."15  The second, over-confidence, "leads to diminished risk perception"16 among 
executives and other decision-makers. 
Recent research on the so-called "dark side" of leadership points to other 
personality traits of executives that may contribute to decisions associated with destruction 
of value or failure in M&A.  A classic article proposes that leaders' incompetence derives 
more from having undesirable traits than from lacking desirable ones, and presents evidence 
that dysfunctional qualities of leaders include tendencies to "blow up, show off, or conform 
when under pressure."17 
Traits associated with relatively poor performance by leaders in a recent empirical 
study included: abrasiveness in interpersonal relationships; disorganization or inattentiveness 
to detail and follow-through; and conflict avoidance.18  A possible example arose in the 
merger of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz, in which Chrysler’s CEO, Eaton, arguably showed all 
three of these traits.19  Eaton made a series of questionable, individual decisions, apparently 
after little consultation with the executive team.  The critical decision to start a joint venture 
                                                 
14 See R. N. Taylor, Strategic Decision Making (1992) in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 961, 979-80 (M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
15 Langevoort, supra note 3, at 71. 
16 Id. 
17 R. Hogan & J. Hogan, Assessing Leadership: A View From the Dark Side, 9 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 40, 
50 (2001). 
18 S. Bartholomew Craig et al., Leadership in University-Based Cooperative Research Centres: A qualitative investigation of 
performance dimensions, 23 INDUSTRY & HIGHER EDUC. 367-77 (October 2009).  
19 BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A. STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW DAIMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 
(2000). 
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with Daimler-Benz (making parts for BMW) contradicted well-founded objections by a 
knowledgeable, senior executive at Chrysler.  How Eaton's personality influenced decisions 
in the failed merger remains unknown, but begs the question: What personality traits foster 
irrational individual decisions by leaders, through what dynamics?  The "dark side" research 
points to traits that could contribute to biased decisions and/or isolate or alienate a leader 
from advisors who might clarify the options and their consequences. 
Another recent, empirical study in the computer industry offers some limited clues 
about the potential role of dark side personality traits of CEOs in acquisitions.20  Among 105 
firms, a composite observational index of each CEO’s narcissism correlated significantly 
with both the number and size of acquisitions by the firm, and with the extremity of 
fluctuations in return on assets and total shareholder returns, from 1992 through 2004.  
However, firm revenues correlated positively with CEO narcissism. 
In brief, recent research from psychology adds evidence linking biased decisions 
with personality traits other than hubris and over-confidence, and points to interpersonal 
dynamics that might isolate leaders from advice that could counter cognitive bias.  This 
research seems to make Langevoort's second step in the case for irrational decisions less tall.  
C. Institutional Factors, Individual Decisions, & Corporate Decisions 
The third step in a convincing argument for irrational individual decision-making 
concerns characteristics of institutions as organizations, which can mitigate or magnify the 
impact of individual, cognitive biases.  Langevoort points out that important, corporate 
decisions tend to involve not just individual executives, but multiple decision-makers in 
sequential processes, often including group collaboration.21  Such institutional processes 
affect whether, and how, an executive's biased decision as an individual translates into a 
decision for the firm.  Langevoort accurately notes that "psychology itself stops being 
concretely helpful once we pass small group behavior"22 to examine such institutional 
factors. 
Psychologists of the 1970s did offer a general theory about the interfaces of 
individuals with organizations, focused on roles (specific, behavioral expectations of 
individuals in particular combinations of specialty and rank in a hierarchy of authority) and 
systems comprised of those roles.23  The systems theory of organizations by Katz and Kahn 
incorporated empirical evidence, available at the time, concerning features of organizational 
structure and process linking individual behavior to organizational outcomes.24 
The systems approach to organizations continued to develop after the 1970s – not 
in psychology, but in the emerging field of organizational behavior, where a huge and 
growing literature of empirical findings25 and theory26 has accumulated about the structure, 
                                                 
20 A. Chatterjee & D. C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company 
Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351 (2007). 
21 Langevoort, supra note 3, at 66. 
22 Id. at 67.  
23 See, e.g., EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 196-99 (3d ed. 1980); HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 1201-45 (Marvin D. Dunnette ed., 1976). 
24 DANIEL KATZ & ROBERT L. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 17-34 (2d ed. 1978). 
25 E.g., JERALD GREENBERG & ROBERT A. BARON, BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS (9th ed. 2008). 
26 E.g., RICHARD L. DAFT, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN (10th ed. 2010). 
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processes, and design of organizations.  Langevoort cites a source from this literature 
describing collective "de-biasing factors"27 that potentially reduce or eliminate cognitive bias 
in individual decision-making.  These factors refer to informal rules and routines as well as 
formal procedures, like assigning someone the role of devil's advocate, which may or may 
not fit with an executive's role, the norms of the executive team, or the organization's 
culture.  
Applying systems theory to understand decision-making in M&A calls for a focus 
on the CEO’s role in the organization's structure.  Public descriptions of their roles by a few 
CEOs point to the potential complexity and variety of expectations their role can include.28  
A study in large private-sector firms reported differences in many features of the CEO's 
role.29  Related questions concern the size, composition, reporting relationships, and 
practices in the executive team, as well as the role(s) of advisor(s) and consultant(s) to the 
CEO.  
Similarly critical to corporate decisions is the role of the board of directors 
("BOD").  Current research points to wide variation in BOD sizes, compositions, 
proportions of outside directors, structural features, processes, CEO interfaces, and 
relationships of these factors with firm performance.30  The research offers few clues about 
the influence of the BOD in the pathways from executive decisions to critical corporate 
decisions, but does raise some questions.  For example: Can smaller, more independent 
BODs exert more effective oversight?  And, to what extent does CEOs' influence on BODs' 
processes diminish the effectiveness of BOD oversight, and allow cognitive biases to affect 
firms' decisions?  Other questions also arise. 
The potential for organizational features to counter individual cognitive bias in 
corporate decision-making does nothing to change the facts about irrational decisions by 
firms.31  Langevoort cites persuasive evidence that many M&A decisions have injured 
shareholders' interests and destroyed value in the organizations involved.  Institutional 
factors obviously did not "de-bias" these decisions, and pose no obstacle to Langevoort's 
third step in the case for irrational decision-making. Institutional features do, however, 
present avenues for intervention toward effective decision-making, which is the fourth step. 
D. The Normative Question: A Basis for Intervention? 
In addressing the normative question about irrational M&A decisions – "So what?"  
Langevoort considers the prospects for legal interventions involving regulation as a vehicle 
for improved decisions, and arrives at no definite answer.  A psychologist's perspective 
involves different vehicles for intervention: organization structure and design; organization 
                                                 
27 Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. 
ORG. BEHAV. 1 (1998). 
28 See, e.g., LARRY BOSSIDY & RAM CHARAN, EXECUTION: THE DISCIPLINE OF GETTING THINGS DONE 1-6 (2002); 
BILL GEORGE, AUTHENTIC LEADERSHIP: REDISCOVERING THE SECRETS TO CREATING LASTING VALUE 91-99 
(2003). 
29 JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE THE LEAP... AND OTHERS DON'T (2001).   
30 See OLIVER P. ROCHE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ORGANIZATION LIFE CYCLE: THE CHANGING ROLE AND 
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (2009); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between 
Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Shaker A. Zahra & John A. Pearce II, 
Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model, 15 J. MGMT. 291 (1989).   
31 See, e.g., Mishina et al., supra note 12, at 701-722. 
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culture and learning; executive team composition, design, and development; leadership role 
definition and clarification; executive consultation and coaching; and management education 
and training.  My remaining questions ask, how best to intervene, and with what urgency? 
From the psychologist's perspective, sound intervention requires foundation in 
scientific knowledge, reflecting a so-called "scientist-practitioner approach."32 As outlined in 
Langevoort's analysis, and in my comments, current knowledge points to a variety of 
psychological, interpersonal, and organizational processes that can prompt irrational 
decisions by individual executives and others that allow or promote their translation into 
flawed corporate decisions. If these processes place executives, their teams, and their 
organizations on slippery slopes, they present learning curves at least as steep. 
III. LEARNING CURVES AHEAD 
Executives responsible for leading today's organizations face three sets of learning 
curves for effective decision-making: individual, team, and organizational.  The ones for 
individuals are most clearly defined and thoroughly studied.  
A. Individual Learning Curves 
A review of 50 years of research on individual decision-making33 suggests that 
today's decision makers are receptive to learning to improve their decisions.  The review 
identifies many sources of cognitive bias and evaluates approaches to learning to avoid them.  
The authors distinguish two decision processes: "System 1 refers to our intuitive system, 
which is typically fast, automatic, effortless, implicit, and emotional; System 2 refers to 
reasoning that is slower, conscious, effortful, explicit, and logical."34  For executives involved 
in M&A decisions, relevant learning involves both of these processes.  Intuitive processes 
can reflect hubris-related errors, like overvaluing assets; expectancy errors, like perceiving 
only what was anticipated; and so on.  Deliberative processes, like applying pricing 
algorithms, can incorporate perceptual errors along with other kinds of mistakes, such as 
overlooking available options, omitting data sources, over-estimating accuracy of 
information, etc.35  
After 25 years of research on training in decision-making, the evidence suggests 
that only one approach has yielded more than "minimal success, and even intensive, 
personalized feedback produced only moderate improvements in decision making."36  This 
result carries two implications for executive learning curves: 1) individual effectiveness calls 
for personal learning from intensive, personalized feedback (the individual learning curve); 
and 2) effective decision-making for the organization involves at least multiple collaborators 
(group or team decisions) and possibly organizational processes.  
                                                 
32 FRANK J. LANDY & JEFFREY M. CONTE, WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 11-12 (3d ed. 2010). 
33 Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be Improved?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 379-383 (2009). 
34 Id. at 380. 
35 See Tommy Gärling et al., Psychology, Financial Decision Making, and Financial Crises, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 
(2009). 
36 Milkman et al., supra note 33, at 380. 
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B. Team Learning Curves 
For the senior leadership groups most critical to corporate decisions about M&A, 
the CEO's executive team and the BOD, the relevant learning curve concerns teamwork in 
general, and effective group decision-making in particular.  To the extent that these groups 
consciously decide to collaborate as teams,37 they can draw on a huge research literature for 
guidance.38  The research suggests, among other things, that teams who actively work toward 
collective learning, and who introduce specific improvements in their interaction processes 
in nine specific areas, can improve their performance.39  My experience similarly suggests 
that executive teams and BODs, who take time to explicitly evaluate their own teamwork, 
and to openly discuss how to improve it, can avoid many of the pitfalls that Langevoort 
describes. 
C. Organization Learning Curves? 
Can entire organizations learn collective processes for effective decisions?  We have 
a limited basis for optimism that organizations can achieve synergy in decisions about 
M&A.40  As for processes of organizational change after a merger or acquisition, the research 
literature on organizational behavior and theory has much to offer.41  How well the 
organizations of the future can assimilate and apply this rapidly expanding knowledge 
remains to be seen. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Three conclusions follow from this review of 1) sources of cognitive bias in 
executive decision-making, 2) the "slippery slope" to flawed corporate decisions, and 3) 
adverse outcomes for firms involved in M&A and their shareholders. First, recent research 
from psychology adds to the already ample basis for Langevoort's persuasive argument 
against the "rational actor model" in favor of bounded rationality in decision-making.  
Second, we need better maps of the boundaries of irrational influences on decision-making, 
their underlying processes, and institutional features that can mitigate them.  Third, for 
today's executive leaders and their organizations, the boundaries on rationality point toward 
learning curves at least as steep as the slippery slopes on the way to effective decision-
making in the future.  
 
                                                 
37 See RUTH WAGEMAN ET AL., SENIOR LEADERSHIP TEAMS: WHAT IT TAKES TO MAKE THEM GREAT 1-55 (2008). 
38 See generally John Mathieu et al., Team Effectiveness 1997-2007: A Review of Recent Advancements and a Glimpse Into the 
Future, 34 J. MGMT. 410 (2008) (selective, narrative review of research on groups and teams). 
39 Jeffery A. LePine et al., A Meta-Analysis of Teamwork Processes: Tests of a Multidimensional Model and Relationships with 
Team Effectiveness Criteria, 61 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 273-307 (2008). 
40 See, e.g., J. Myles Shaver, A Paradox of Synergy: Contagion and Capacity Effects in Mergers and Acquisitions, 31 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 962-976 (2006). 
41 See, e.g., RICHARD L. DAFT, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN 159-60 (10th ed. 2010). 
